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Impact of Ethiopia’s Community Based Health
Insurance on Household Economic Welfare
Zelalem Yilma, AnagawMebratie, Robert Sparrow, Marleen Dekker,
Getnet Alemu, and Arjun S. Bedi
In 2011, in an attempt to increase access to health care and reduce household vulnerabil-
ity to out-of-pocket health expenditure, the Government of Ethiopia launched a
Community-Based Health Insurance Scheme (CBHI). This paper uses three rounds of
household survey data, collected before and after the introduction of the CBHI pilot, to
assess the impact of the scheme on household consumption, income, indebtedness, and
livestock holdings. We find that enrollment leads to a 5 percentage point—or 13%—
decline in the probability of borrowing and is associated with an increase in household
income. There is no evidence that enrolling in the scheme affects consumption or live-
stock holdings. Our results show that the scheme reduces reliance on potentially
harmful coping responses such as borrowing. This paper adds to the relatively small
body of work that rigorously evaluates the impact of CBHI schemes on economic
welfare. JEL codes: I1, O1
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Various forms of health insurance have been advocated as market based risk-
transfer mechanisms with the potential to guard against the impoverishing
effects of ill health (see Gertler and Gruber 2002; Asfaw and Von Braun 2004).
The recent proliferation of Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) schemes
in many developing countries emanates partly from a need to provide financial
protection against unexpected health-care costs and to enhance access to modern
health care. As a prelude to national coverage, in June 2011, the Ethiopian
Government introduced a pilot CBHI scheme in 13 Woredas (districts) across the
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four main regional states. The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of this
scheme on measures of household economic welfare: consumption, income, in-
debtedness, and livestock.
The economic burden associated with the incidence of ill health has been doc-
umented in a recent but rapidly growing literature on poverty dynamics. Most of
these studies examine the consumption implications of health shocks, while
some delve into the portfolio of coping responses adopted by households.1 A
number of studies show that households in the informal rural sector rely on tradi-
tional coping responses such as selling assets and informal borrowing to deal
with the adverse consequences of ill health.2 These coping responses are not cost
free but entail a compromise—protecting current consumption at the cost of
future vulnerability (Flores et al. 2008).
Health insurance primarily addresses out-of-pocket health expenditure, one of
two sources of household financial stress from ill health. The second source is
forgone income due to declining capacity to work. While health insurance
schemes are not designed to curb this source of vulnerability, they might still
provide some protection to households’ agricultural income by facilitating early
recovery and by reducing pressure on households to reallocate resources meant
for productive purposes (e.g., to buy fertilizers and high value seeds) to medical
spending. By reducing reliance on potentially harmful coping responses, such as
borrowing at usurious rates, health insurance schemes might protect household’s
economic welfare both in the short and the long run.
Although analyses of the impact of health insurance has been the subject of a
large body of empirical literature, much of this work has focused on health-care
utilization and out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditure or on induced behavio-
ral responses such as moral hazard. Reviews of the literature by Ekman (2004)
and Mebratie et al. (2013a) conclude that the evidence base is questionable with
regard to the financial protection provided by CBHI. The bulk of the CBHI eval-
uation literature, with few exceptions,3 relies on cross-section based association
and does not identify causal effects. Ignoring self-selection in voluntary insur-
ance uptake is likely to lead to biased estimates of the impact of CBHI.
Moreover, while there are studies that examine whether health insurance
helps protect income or wealth from declining due to ill health (Lindelow and
Wagstaff 2005) or have studied the effect of such schemes on consumption
(Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005), there are relatively few studies that have evaluated
the impact of such schemes on indebtedness and livestock.
This paper uses three rounds of household panel data—a baseline and two
follow-up surveys. The presence of a baseline survey enables us to examine self-
selection and to control for both observable and unobservable time invariant
1. See, among others, Gertler and Gruber (2002), Genoni (2012), Monahan (2013), Sparrow et al.
(2014).
2. For example, Sparrow et al. (2014) and Yilma et al. (2014).
3. Jowett et al. (2003), for Vietnam, and Levine et al. (2014), for Cambodia, find statistically
significant negative effects of CBHI on OOP health spending.
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factors, which may affect self-selection. To identify the effect of the scheme on
income, consumption, livestock and indebtedness we rely on both fixed effects
and matching methods and compare results for different control groups (within
and across pilot and non-pilot districts).
I I . C B H I S C H E M E D E S I G N
In June 2011, as part of its health sector financing reform (HSFR) initiatives, the
Ethiopian Government launched a pilot CBHI scheme in 13 districts in the four
main regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR) of the country.4,5
Regional administrative bodies selected these districts based on directives provid-
ed by the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH). The selection criteria require that
the districts fulfill five conditions while in practice selection was based on two
conditions: undertaking HSFRs and geographical accessibility of health centers
(located close to the main road).6
The community element to the CBHI scheme is that villages (Kebeles) decide
whether or not to join (based on a simple majority vote), and are subsequently
involved in management and supervision. Possibly due to prior sensitization ac-
tivities, all villages in pilot districts voted in favor of the scheme. Once a Kebele
agrees to join, household enrolment is voluntary. To reduce adverse selection,
enrollment is at the household level rather than the individual (FMoH 2008).
Benefit packages, registration fees, premiums, and premium payment methods
are similar within regions but vary slightly across regions. On average, the com-
bined premiums for core household members (parents and underage children)
amount to about 1–1.4% of household monthly non-medical expenditure.7 The
CBHI scheme is subsidized by both the central and regional/district governments.
The central government provides a general subsidy amounting to a quarter of the
premium collected at district level while the regional and district level governments
cover the costs of providing a fee waiver for the poorest 10% of the population.8
The benefit package includes both outpatient and inpatient service utilization
at public facilities. Enrolled households may not seek care in private facilities
unless a particular service or drug is unavailable at a public facility. The scheme
4. Although initially the plan was to launch the pilot scheme in three districts in each of the four
regions, an additional district in Oromiya region volunteered to join the pilot scheme and was included.
5. The main components of the health sector financing reform include revenue retention and
utilization by health facilities, fee waiver and exemption of certain services, and establishment of private
wings in public hospitals.
6. The complete set of selection criteria include (1) willingness of district authorities to implement the
scheme, (2) commitment of districts to support the scheme, (3) geographical accessibility of health centers,
(4) quality of health centers, (5) the implementation of cost recovery, local revenue retention, and public
pharmacy policies in health centers.
7. In 2011, monthly household non-medical expenditure was ETB 1103 (USD 1 equals ETB 18).
Details on premiums are presented in Table A1 of the supplemental appendix.
8. These households are categorized as indigent groups (households without land, house, or any
valuable assets). In December 2012 about 9% of total eligible households had received a fee waiver.
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excludes treatment abroad and treatments with large cosmetic value such as arti-
ficial teeth and plastic surgery. The referral procedure requires members to visit
health centers before they may be referred to hospitals (district or regional).
Those who do not follow this referral procedure need to cover half the costs of
their medical treatment.9 In our sample, CBHI uptake reached 41% in April
2012 and 48 percent in 2013, which is relatively high compared to experiences in
other African countries.10
I I I . D A T A
We use three rounds of a household panel data set, collected in March/April of
2011, 2012, and 2013. The first round was collected a few months before the
launch of the CBHI scheme and serves as a baseline. Sixteen districts located
across four main regions of the country (Amhara, Oromiya, Tigray, and
SNNPR) are included in the survey. For each region we include all three districts
that implemented the CBHI pilot and one selected nondistrict. The nonpilot dis-
tricts were chosen based on the same criteria that were used to select the pilot dis-
tricts. Within the districts we applied a two-stage sampling design, randomly
sampling villages and households. The total sample size in the first round was
1,632 households comprising 9,455 individuals, of which 98% and 97% were
successfully resurveyed in 2012 and 2013.
The survey instrument contains information on a variety of individual and
household socio-economic attributes such as consumption expenditure, crop
output, off-farm income, assets, outstanding loans, household demographics,
employment, and health conditions. The total value of all outstanding loans at
the time of the survey is used to measure indebtedness. Our measure of consump-
tion is monthly nonmedical per adult equivalent consumption.11
I V. M E T H O D S
The nonrandom nature of insurance uptake is an important empirical concern in
identifying the causal effect of CBHI. Demand for health insurance may be
driven by affordability or latent health status, in which case simple differences in
outcomes between CBHI enrolled and nonenrolled households may not be
viewed as causal effects of the scheme. Table 1 suggests non-random uptake. At
baseline, households that subsequently take up CBHI have higher crop output
and income, are more likely to have borrowed, have larger outstanding loans,
9. Access to tertiary level care differs across regions. While in Oromiya coverage includes hospitals
located outside the region, in SNNPR they may visit only the nearest public hospital. In Amhara and
Tigray, CBHI enrollees may visit any public hospital within the region but not outside the region.
10. For example, uptake in Senegal after two years was 4.8% (Smith and Sulzbach 2008) and in
Tanzania 2.8 percent after six years (Chee et al. 2002).
11. We adopt the age-sex based adult equivalent household size suggested by Dercon and Krishnan
(1998).
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and larger livestock holdings than households that do not insure. However, we
see little differences in consumption. A naive comparison of postintervention
outcomes would overestimate the impact of CBHI on income and livestock and
underestimate the impact on indebtedness.
We therefore estimate a household fixed effects model that controls for both
observed and unobserved time-invariant confounding factors,
Yit ¼ bCBHIit þ dTt þ wXit þ ui þ 1it; ð1Þ
where Yit is the outcome of interest for household i at time t, the dummy variable
CBHIit indicates whether household i is insured in year t, and T indicates a set of
TA B L E 1. Baseline Differences in Outcome Variables: Insured vs Noninsured
Insured
households
Noninsured households
All districts Pilot districts Control districts
(N ¼ 656) (N ¼ 911) (N ¼ 527) (N ¼ 384)
Income
Crop output 8499.0
(9104.3)
5985.0***
(7044.6)
6551.3***
(7440.0)
5212.8***
(6395.8)
Total income 10017.2
(9828.0)
7091.8***
(7335.5)
7757.6***
(8089.1)
6196.2***
(6075.1)
Consumption
Total 244.7
(146.9)
249.4
(170.4)
241.9
(162.5)
259.6
(180.5)
Food 201.1
(125.4)
206.3
(144.6)
200.6
(144.8)
214.0
(144.3)
Nonfood 43.8
(39.6)
43.0
(45.1)
41.2
(37.7)
45.5
(53.6)
Indebtedness
Outstanding loan (%) 37.5
(48.4)
26.0***
(43.9)
26.6***
(44.2)
25.3***
(43.5)
Total outstanding loan 880.3
(1689.2)
527.6***
(1259.3)
492.8***
(1172.7)
575.4***
(1369.5)
Livestock
Goats 1.2
(5.3)
0.8**
(2.2)
0.7**
(2.2)
0.8
(2.1)
Sheep 1.8
(3.0)
1.0***
(2.6)
0.9***
(2.2)
1.2***
(3.0)
Bulls 0.4
(1.4)
0.3**
(0.7)
0.3*
(0.6)
0.3**
(0.7)
Calves 0.8
(1.2)
0.6***
(0.9)
0.6***
(0.9)
0.5***
(0.8)
Oxen 1.4
(1.3)
0.8***
(1.0)
0.9***
(1.0)
0.8***
(0.9)
Notes: Columns 1–4 report mean (standard deviation); statistical significance refers to differenc-
es in means between the control group and the insured households: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1. Crop
output refers to total value of production in the past one year. Total income is the sum of crop
output and off-farm income. All livestock types refer to number of livestock owned. All monetary
values are in Ethiopian Birr (ETB).
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dummy variables for each of the three years. Household fixed effects are captured
by ui, and 1it is a random error term. Time varying controls Xit include demo-
graphics, various measures of socioeconomic status, shocks, and household head
characteristics. We also combine the fixed effects approach with propensity score
matching (PSM). CBHI uptake is modelled as a function of baseline characteris-
tics, and we estimate equation (1) only for households on support.
We have two groups of control households: uninsured households in pilot dis-
tricts and households from nonpilot districts. Each control group introduces dif-
ferent sources of bias. For the pilot districts, the voluntary nature of the scheme
could induce selection bias. The fixed effects would purge selection effects if
these are based on time-invariant characteristics. Pilot districts are also prone to
spill-over effects. However, these are most likely to be relevant to health-care use
and not for economic outcomes, at least not in the short term.12
The control districts are drawn from the same regions and fulfill the criteria
stipulated by the government in selecting CBHI districts, while any remaining
geographical differences will be controlled for by the fixed effects. Although
fixed effects cannot deal with aggregate shocks we explicitly control for informa-
tion on 22 different shock types (natural shock, crime/conflict related shock,
health shock, and economic shock). We also conduct a sensitivity analysis, where
we test if the results are sensitive to excluding them.13
Finally, there remains a possible confounding effect from other social pro-
grams that share targeting and selection criteria with the CBHI pilot. We are
aware of only one such social safety net program in rural Ethiopia, the PSNP
(Productive Safety Net Program). For both sets of control households, we esti-
mate models with and without an indicator variable for PSNP.
V. E S T I M A T E S
Table 2 presents treatment effects using different control groups. Across methods
we find a statistically significant positive impact on income (crop output and
total income) for the pilot district comparison only. While the magnitudes of the
estimates decline as we exclude households that are off support, we find that
crop output and total income increase by ETB 785 and ETB 1027, respectively,
or 9%–10% of baseline values. While the coefficients are also positive when we
use households in nonpilot districts as controls, the estimates are not precise. The
results provide no evidence that CBHI affects household consumption, as the
coefficients lack statistical significance and the magnitudes are small.
We find a negative impact on the probability of having outstanding loans
ranging between 4% and 5%, depending on methods and control groups, which
12. We run a placebo test where treatment indicator takes a value of 1 if uninsured household lives in
pilot district and 0 otherwise. We do not find any indication of spill-over effects. Results are reported in a
supplemental appendix, table A4.
13. The robustness test is not reported here but included in a supplemental appendix, table A3.
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TA B L E 2. Welfare Effects of CBHI
FE with covariates FE with covariates after matching
All districts Control districts Pilot districts All districts Control districts Pilot districts
Income
Crop output 459.9 286.6 816.4* 418.6 243.8 785.4*
(477.4) (572.4) (460.7) (481.8) (573.8) (470.1)
Total income 675.7 427.8 1,092* 593.9 338.2 1,027*
(571.3) (632.7) (593.6) (577.3) (633.7) (604.2)
Consumption
Total 18.01 25.03 12.38 26.556 21.874 214.96
(27.45) (30.75) (33.02) (21.34) (24.82) (26.35)
Food 18.59 26.94 10.87 25.655 0.405 216.18
(26.70) (29.95) (32.25) (20.67) (23.92) (25.68)
Nonfood 0.113 21.044 2.436 0.0201 21.285 2.467
(2.969) (3.581) (3.166) (3.047) (3.748) (3.228)
Indebtedness
Loan (0/1) 20.0506** 20.0540** 20.0340 20.0483** 20.0484** 20.0341
(0.0222) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0225) (0.0235) (0.0243)
Loan amount 244.87 251.24 216.72 236.24 238.18 210.62
(69.76) (77.20) (70.32) (70.81) (77.93) (71.84)
Livestock
Goats 20.0835 20.0357 20.129 20.0836 20.0247 20.136
(0.141) (0.124) (0.151) (0.145) (0.127) (0.156)
Sheep 20.0321 0.0237 20.0808 20.0336 0.0205 20.0808
(0.113) (0.129) (0.114) (0.114) (0.130) (0.115)
(Continued)
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TABLE 2. Continued
FE with covariates FE with covariates after matching
All districts Control districts Pilot districts All districts Control districts Pilot districts
Bulls 0.0453 0.0421 0.0247 0.0458 0.0447 0.0209
(0.0362) (0.0415) (0.0349) (0.0368) (0.0425) (0.0356)
Calves 20.0177 20.0360 20.00440 20.0210 20.0380 20.00400
(0.0631) (0.0547) (0.0647) (0.0644) (0.0562) (0.0664)
Oxen 0.0451 0.0590 0.0286 0.0439 0.0574 0.0277
(0.0452) (0.0480) (0.0467) (0.0464) (0.0495) (0.0483)
Notes: The column headings refer to the choice of control group: all districts (all non-insured households included), control districts (only noninsured
households in control districts included), and pilot districts (only non-insured households in pilot districts included). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clus-
tered at the village level. Results are broadly similar when excluding the time-varying covariates. A list of covariates is given in the supplemental appendix
(Table A2). In the case of livestock we exclude the asset index quintiles as the index includes number of livestock.
Statistical significance: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1.
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translates to about 13% of baseline values.14 There are also negative coefficients
for the amount of outstanding loans although these are imprecise. Estimates for
all types of livestock are not statistically significant.
V I . C O N C L U S I O N
This paper explored the impact of Ethiopia’s CBHI pilot scheme on household
economic welfare. We found the main benefit of the scheme is its effect on reduc-
ing the need to borrow. This may have longer-term benefits in reducing vulnera-
bility to other forms of shocks. A related study has found a sharp impact on
increasing health care utilization (Mebratie et al. 2013b). The combined results
provide support to the government’s recent move to extend the CBHI pilot to a
total of 161 districts for further testing. However, a nationwide scale up requires
an examination of the scheme’s financial sustainability.
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